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There is a long-standing debate in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of science regarding how best
to interpret the relationship between neuroscience and psychology. It has traditionally been argued that
either the two domains will evolve and change over time until they converge on a single unified account
of human behaviour, or else that they will continue to work in isolation given that they identify prop-
erties and states that exist autonomously from one another (due to the multiple-realizability of psy-
chological states). In this paper, I argue that progress in psychology and neuroscience is contingent on the
fact that both of these positions are false. Contra the convergence position, I argue that the theories of
psychology and the theories of neuroscience are scientifically valuable as representational tools precisely
because they cannot be integrated into a single account. However, contra the autonomy position, I
propose that the theories of psychology and neuroscience are deeply dependent on one another for
further refinement and improvement. In this respect, there is an irreconcilable codependence between
psychology and neuroscience that is necessary for both domains to improve and progress. The two
domains are forever linked while simultaneously being unable to integrate.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of ScienceThere is a long-standing debate in the philosophy of mind and
the philosophy of science regarding how best to interpret the
relationship between the theories and models of neuroscience,
and those of psychology. Both domains are dedicated to the sci-
entific study and explanation of cognitive behaviour, yet each
domain appears to explain and predict this behaviour by
appealing to distinct sets of theories and models, and by
employing different kinds of concepts and categories. How then
can we make sense of the relationship between these different
domains, and move forward in our scientific understanding of
such behaviour? Traditionally, philosophers of science have pro-
posed one of two possible options for how this relationship might
ultimately be understood, and their seemingly conflicting ac-
counts resolved:hst@gmail.com.
E., Giving up on convergence
es in History and Philosophy1. As neuroscience and psychology improve and change over time,
the theories and models of both domains will slowly co-evolve
together, each undergoing alterations and changes until they
converge on a single unified theory of cognitive behaviour (e.g.
Bickle, 1998, 2003, 2006; Boone & Piccinini, 2015; Churchland,
1989; Craver, 2007; Piccinini & Craver, 2011).
2. Neuroscience and psychology will not converge because the
two domains characterize systems at different levels of orga-
nization. The theories of psychology characterize functional
states of systems that can be realized in different ways by
different mechanisms, while the theories of neuroscience only
characterize the physical implementation of neurological
mechanisms. Given that the functional properties and regu-
larities of psychology exist autonomously from any one system
that realizes them, the theories of psychology are therefore
irreducible to those of neuroscience. As a result, psychology
and neuroscience will proceed largely in isolation from oneand autonomy:Why the theories of psychology and neuroscience are
of Science (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.10.001
E. Hochstein / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2015) 1e102another (e.g. Aizawa & Gillett, 2011; Burge, 2010; Crane, 2001,
pp. 62-66; Cummins, 1983; Fodor, 1974, 1998; Johnson-Laird,
1983; Menzies & List, 2010).
In this paper, I argue that progress in neuroscience and psychology
has beenmade possible by the very fact that both of these positions
are false. More specifically, I propose that scientific progress in both
domains is contingent on their theories being irreconcilable with
one another in various respects (making convergence impossible),
but also on the fact that the different theories and models do not
identify states and properties that exist autonomously from one
another. The theories and models of psychology and neuroscience
are deeply dependent on one another for further refinement and
improvement, yet this dependence does not imply the eventual
convergence of the two disciplines.
Human behaviour is the product of a vast number of causal in-
fluences, from historical, to biological, to environmental. The sheer
complexity of the causal influences at work means that we often
must employ distinct scientific theories with radically different
idealizing and simplifying assumptions depending on which of
these influences we wish to study, and which we do not. Different
idealizations will be used as the foundation for different types of
scientific theories depending on which representational goals we
seek to satisfy.
When it comes to understanding the relationship between
psychology and neuroscience, the relevant question therefore be-
comes: what are the representational goals of neuroscience, and
how do they differ from those of psychology? I propose that in
virtue of representing different aspects of cognitive systems, the
two domains must adopt different idealizing assumptions about
the target system, resulting in vastly different and incompatible
sets of theories useful for their own representational purposes, but
not the other’s. Convergence between these domains would
therefore require that they give up the very idealizing assumptions
that allow them to effectively represent the different aspects of the
cognitive system we use them to study.
The fact that the models and theories employed by psychology
are not useful for the same representational tasks as those
employed in neuroscience (and vice versa) has led a number of
philosophers to mistakenly infer that the two domains operate
autonomously from one another, with the theories and findings of
one domain being largely unhelpful to the theories and findings of
the other. I will demonstrate that such a view is false, and is not
supported by empirical research. There is strong empirical evidence
that as we develop more detailed psychological theories and
models, it puts essential constraints on what the neural mecha-
nisms of the system are, and how they operate. Likewise, the more
we know about the underlying neurological architecture of a sys-
tem, the more it constrains the sorts of psychological generaliza-
tions we can make about it. As such, while psychology and
neuroscience will not converge towards a single unifying account,
neither can they stand apart from each other. This is not a problem
that must be overcome, however, but is in fact a virtue that makes
scientific understanding possible. It is the very tension between the
irreconcilability of these different theories, and their required co-
dependence, that drives scientific practice forward.
In order to make this argument, I begin in Section 1 by discus-
sing how the relationship between psychology and neuroscience
has been traditionally conceived. In Section 2, I demonstrate why
these options are inappropriate for understanding the relationship
that exists between the two domains. Lastly, in Section 3, I argue for
an alternative account that justifies both the irreconcilability of
psychology with neuroscience, as well as their necessaryPlease cite this article in press as: Hochstein, E., Giving up on convergence
codependent as well as irreconcilable, Studies in History and Philosophycodependence. I end by demonstrating why this irreconcilable
codependence is essential for scientific progress.
1. Traditional characterizations of the psychological/
neuroscientific divide
1.1. Convergence
The motivating assumption that underlies the argument for
the convergence of neuroscience and psychology is that both
domains share the same general goal of developing an ideally
correct theory of cognitive behaviour, but differ in their ap-
proaches for achieving it. Psychology is an attempt to understand
cognitive behaviour by employing a largely “top down” approach,
while neuroscience is an attempt to understand this same
behaviour from a “bottom up” perspective. In other words, psy-
chology attempts to understand cognitive behaviour by identi-
fying and characterizing the high-level cognitive capabilities and
deficits of the system, the behavioural patterns displayed by the
system, and the environmental contexts in which certain be-
haviours appear. They then use this information to draw con-
clusions about what the underlying neurological mechanisms of
the system must be like. Neuroscience, meanwhile, starts by
studying the neurological mechanisms themselves, and then uses
this information to draw conclusions about what the overall
cognitive behaviour of the system is likely to be in various situ-
ations. Both domains therefore directly inform and constrain one
another. Knowing more about the underlying mechanisms of the
system informs our understanding of how the system will
behave. This allows us to change and improve our psychological
models to better account for this information. Likewise, the more
detailed our psychological theories become regarding the overall
behaviour of the system, the more it informs our understanding
of what the neurological mechanisms are doing, and thus puts
constraints on what their underlying architecture is. As Patricia
Churchland notes:
Crudely, neuroscience needs psychology because it needs to
know what the system does; that is, it needs high-level speci-
fications of the input-output properties of the system. Psy-
chology needs neuroscience for the same reason: it needs to
know what the system does. That is, it needs to know whether
lower-level specifications bear out the initial input-output the-
ory, where and how to revise the input-output theory, and how
to characterize processes at levels below the top. (Churchland,
1989, p. 373)
A similar claim is made by Boone and Piccinini (2015), who argue
that:
The upshot is that cognition cannot be explained without ac-
counting for the ways in which structures constrain functions
and vice versa. In the long run, the mutual constraints between
structures and functions lead cognitive psychologists and neu-
roscientists to look to each other’s work to inform their analyses.
[.] The best strategy is to investigate both structures and
functions simultaneously. [.] This is the main driving force
between the merging of neuroscience and cognitive psychology
into cognitive neuroscience. (pp. 14-15)
Under these accounts, the concepts, categories, and theories of both
domains will be constantly changing as they are continuously
altered to better fit with the emerging findings of the other domain.
This process of mutual refinement continues until a single unified
account of the system is developed.and autonomy:Why the theories of psychology and neuroscience are
of Science (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.10.001
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the reduction of psychology to neuroscience, or the elimination of
psychology in favour of neuroscience, can likewise be folded into
this general project of convergence. Reduction is often thought to
be the endpoint of the convergence process. Churchland, for
instance, claims that:
From the reductionist viewpoint, this possibility [that psycho-
logical categories will not be able to map onto neurobiological
categories] does not look like an obstacle to reduction so much
as it predicts a fragmentation and reconfiguration of the psy-
chological categories. (1989, p. 365)
As evidence for such a claim, Churchland offers the psychological
concept of “memory” as a case study. While the original folk notion
of memory assumed that therewas a single unifiedmemory system
operating within the brain, neurological research has revealed a
number of distinct memory systems. Thus the concept of “memory”
in psychology has fragmented from a single category into multiple
categories in order to better fit with our discovery of the underlying
neurological kinds. Through this continual fragmentation and
reconfiguration of our psychological categories, she proposes that
the eventual reduction of psychology to neuroscience “is more or
less inevitable” (Churchland, 1989, p. 374).
Likewise, arguments for the elimination of certain psychological
concepts from science are often defended on the grounds that such
concepts are extremely unlikely to survive this process of frag-
mentation and refinement that drives convergence (see, for
example, Bickle,1998, 2003, 2006; Churchland,1981; Hooker,1981;
Stich,1983). Paul Churchland, for instance, in his seminal defence of
Eliminative Materialism argues that certain mental categories,
specifically those characterized as propositional attitudes (which
he labels “folk psychology”), are so different from the sorts of cat-
egories that will survive the convergence process that we ought to
abandon them. In his words,
.the eliminative materialist is [.] pessimistic about the
prospects of reduction, but his reason is that folk psychology is a
radically inadequate account of our internal activities, too
confused and too defective to win survival through intertheo-
retic reduction. On his view it will simply be displaced by a
better theory of those activities. (1981, p. 72)
The underlying assumption is that some psychological categories
are so different from the sorts of categories that will emerge from
a convergence of psychology and neuroscience that they are
extremely unlikely to make it through the process in any
recognizable form. As a result, deliberately keeping such con-
cepts and categories as part of our scientific theories will only
cause problems for future scientific endeavours and stands in the
way of the development of a unified account of cognitive
behaviour.
This general account is also compatible with more recent the-
ories of convergence that base their accounts on the mechanistic
nature of explanation in the life sciences (see: Boone & Piccinini,
2015; Craver, 2007; Piccinini & Craver, 2011). These positions
emphasize the fact that cognitive behaviour is the product of
complex neurophysiological mechanisms that can be described at
different grains of abstraction. Under these accounts, psychological
models and theories provide abstract descriptions of these mech-
anisms, often in the form of functional analyses. In this respect, they
act as sketches of the neurophysiological mechanisms being stud-
ied, with many structural details omitted. This sketch can then be
used to guide neuroscientific research, which in turn fills in this
sketch with more explicit details of the structures and causes atPlease cite this article in press as: Hochstein, E., Giving up on convergence
codependent as well as irreconcilable, Studies in History and Philosophywork in the system. Through this process, psychology and neuro-
science converge on a single unified neuroscientific account. As
Piccinini & Craver put it:
Functional analysis of a system’s capacities provides a sketch
of a mechanistic explanation. [.] Thus, if psychological
explanation is functional, as so many people assume, and
psychological explanation is worthy of its name, then psy-
chological explanation is mechanistic. Once the structural
aspects that are missing from a functional analysis are filled
in, functional analysis turns into a more complete mechanistic
explanation. By this process, functional analyses can be
seamlessly integrated with mechanistic explanations, and
psychology can be seamlessly integrated with neuroscience.
(2011, pp. 307-308)
All of these views implicitly assume that psychology and neuro-
science are both striving towards the same goal of a single unified
account of cognitive behaviour, and so will inevitably converge
along the way towards this goal. This position can be contrasted
with another view that has gained a great deal of prominence in the
philosophy of mind. It is to this contrasting view we turn to next.
1.2. Autonomy
What is likely the most commonly held view among contem-
porary philosophers of mind regarding the relationship between
psychology and neuroscience is that the explanations of the two
domains are largely autonomous from one another. This idea is
primarily based on appeals to computationalism and multiple-
realizability. More specifically, it is argued that psychological
theories and models are best construed as identifying computa-
tional states of complex cognitive systems, but not the way in
which these states are realized in any one system. Given that
computational states are defined functionally, systems that are
physically implemented in numerous different ways can all
instantiate the same computational states just so long as they have
the appropriate functional organization. In contrast, neuroscien-
tific theories and models only describe the implementation of
neurological systems, and not the multiply realizable functional
states characterized by psychology. In this respect, the two do-
mains cannot converge on a single unified theory given that they
cross-classify cognitive systems in order to identify autonomous
sets of properties and relations (for an elaboration on this position,
see: Aizawa & Gillett, 2011; Burge, 2010; Crane, 2001, pp. 62-66;
Cummins, 1983; Fodor, 1974,1998; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Menzies &
List, 2010).
Put another way, the reason that we can never use a neurosci-
entific model to characterize the regularities identified by a psy-
chological model is because the computational states identified by
the psychological model, and the causal powers they have, are
autonomous from any particular implementation thatmight realize
them. As Menzies & List argue:
Given that a mental state is typically realized in many different
ways, we can expect that whatever causal powers it has, it has
them independently of the particular way it is realized. In other
words, we can expect that a mental state’s causal powers do not
depend on which of its possible realizers happens to be the
actual one. (2010, p. 121)
This particular account of the relationship between neuroscience
and psychology has gained a great deal of traction in the philosophy
of mind over the years, to the point of being described as having
“such overwhelming prima facie plausibility that the burden ofand autonomy:Why the theories of psychology and neuroscience are
of Science (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.10.001
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wise” (Block, 1980, p. 178). According to such accounts, psychology
and neuroscience will proceed largely in isolation from one
another, with convergence between the two domains being
impossible.
So of these two possible accounts (convergence and autonomy),
which is the best for understanding the relationship between
psychology and neuroscience? I propose that neither are appro-
priate, and that a new alternative is required. Before offering such
an alternative, it is important to understand why both existing
positions run into problems.2 It should be noted that this does not mean that we never encounter instances of
local reductions between psychological theories and neuroscientific ones. In some
cases, psychological capacities have been shown to map directly onto certain neural
mechanisms. Domains like cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience have
developed explicitly as an attempt to identify such local reductions. Yet it is a
mistake to assume that the success of particular local reductions implies that all, or
even most, theories of psychology are likely to reduce to neuroscientific theories in
this way, since many complex cognitive behaviours characterized by psychologists
are known to be dependent on causal features beyond the mechanisms studied by
neuroscientists.
Ironically some advocates of convergence have raised this very objection against
the theories of convergence proposed by others, while implicitly making the very
same mistake themselves. John Bickle (2003), for example, points to specific cases
of local reductions to argue that the theories of psychology and neuroscience will
inevitably converge on a unified account of cognitive behaviour in terms of the
theories of molecular neuroscience. Meanwhile, Boone & Piccinini have countered
by arguing that.
The main problem with this form of reductionism is that specific molecular
events are at best only partial explanations of cognitive phenomena. [.] Mo-
lecular events are only relevant to the extent that they occur within specific
neural structures, and locating the relevant neural structures requiresmore than
purely molecular neuroscience. (2015, p. 6)
In other words, even though there are some specific instances where a cognitive
capacity can be locally reduced to particular molecular events, this does not imply
that all cognitive behaviour can be understood strictly in terms of such events, as the
causal mechanisms and influences required to produce many cognitive behaviours
require more than the molecular mechanisms characterized by molecular neuro-
science.
Yet despite making this observation, Boone & Piccinini go on to claim that psy-
chology and neuroscience are converging on a unified account of cognitive behav-
iour in terms of the theories of cognitive neuroscience instead of molecular
neuroscience. They claim to avoid Bickle’s mistake by noting that cognitive neuro-
science does not characterize neurological mechanisms only at the molecular level,
but that they characterize such mechanisms at multiple levels simultaneously.
Meanwhile, they still insist that “every level of a neurocognitive mechanism is
neuraldor more precisely, every level is either (at least partially) composed of
neurons or is a component of a neuron” (2015, p.15). Yet this falls into the same trap
that snared Bickle. The theories of cognitive neuroscience used to characterize such
multi-level mechanisms similarly provide only a partial explanation of cognitive
phenomena. Historical, developmental, and environmental influences play an
essential role in the production of cognitive behaviours, and the study of these in-2. Where the traditional accounts go wrong
2.1. Problems with convergence
At the heart of the convergence account is the idea that through
sufficient refinements to the theories of psychology and neurosci-
ence, their convergence towards a single unified account is inevi-
table. Yet there are good reasons to deny this idea. In order to see
why, let us explore the sorts of complications and complexities that
would have to emerge from the convergence project.
Recall that according to the convergence account, the theories
and models of neuroscience provide a “bottom up” approach to
studying cognitive behaviour by showing how interventions in
the neurological mechanisms responsible for cognition affect
their output. Meanwhile models and theories from domains like
social psychology, developmental psychology, and community
psychology, provide a “top down” study of cognitive behaviour
by characterizing how these same neurological mechanisms
behave when embedded in various social and environmental
contexts. The underlying assumption is that both neuroscience
and psychology are studying the same neurological mechanisms,
but from different angles. Consider Piccinini & Craver’s claim
that:
Insofar as psychologists pursue constitutive explanations, they
ought to acknowledge that psychological explanations describe
aspects of the same multilevel neural mechanism that neuro-
scientists study. (2011, p. 285)
But is this true? While it is certainly the case that psychological
theories and models describe cognitive behaviour produced by
systems that are partially constituted by multilevel neural mecha-
nisms, it does not follow from this that psychological theories and
models are describing only neural mechanisms. After all, cognitive
behaviour is not solely the product of neural mechanisms. Addi-
tional causal influences include genetic, epigenetic, historical,
environmental, dynamic, developmental, socio-economic, cultural,
and the embodied characteristics of the system, to list only a few.1
In virtue of characterizing and predicting the behaviours and ca-
pacities of entire cognitive systems, the models and theories of
psychology are intended to describe far more than the neurological
mechanisms identified by neuroscientists. The theories and model
of neuroscience characterize and predict only a small subset of the
causes of cognitive behaviours studied by psychologists. Therefore
forcing the concepts and theories of psychology to fragment and
change in order to map directly onto the neurological mechanisms
of the brain is counterproductive. By doing so, psychological the-
ories will become better at describing neurological mechanisms in1 To complicate matters further, many of these causes interact together in
complex ways. In doing so, they directly alter the behaviour of neural mechanisms,
and change the sorts of contributions they make to cognitive behaviour.
Please cite this article in press as: Hochstein, E., Giving up on convergence
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cognitive systems.2
Another problem facing the convergence account is that the
hierarchical nature of biological mechanisms further complicates
any account of convergence between the two domains. As is often
the case with biological mechanisms, the parts of a given mecha-
nism can satisfy the criteria for being mechanisms themselves,
creating a hierarchy of levels whereby mechanisms are embedded
within larger and more complex mechanisms (for a detailed ac-
count of this sense of compositional levels within biological
mechanisms, see: Bechtel, 2007, 2008; Boone & Piccinini, 2015;
Craver, 2007, 2009; Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Piccinini
& Craver, 2011).
One important feature of such multi-level mechanisms is that
the behaviour of higher level mechanisms depends not only on the
behaviour of the lower level mechanisms, but also on the way in
which these lower level mechanisms are organized together so as
to instantiate the higher level system. The behaviour of the lower
level mechanisms in isolation will be very different from the
behaviour of those mechanisms when embedded within the
context of the larger system. This means that the theories most
useful for characterizing the behaviour of the lower level mecha-
nisms will not be sufficient to account for the way in which the
integrated system as a whole behaves. This is further exacerbatedfluences gowell beyond the boundaries of cognitive neuroscience. Thus even if there
are instance of local reductions between certain psychological theories and certain
cognitive neuroscientific ones, this does not mean that all cognitive capabilities of
the system studied by psychologists can be understood strictly in terms of theories
of cognitive neuroscience.
and autonomy:Why the theories of psychology and neuroscience are
of Science (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.10.001
3 Examples of psychological models that interpret cognitive systems in terms of
propositional attitudes, and which have been shown empirically to be predictive of
a range of cognitive behaviours, include: the Belief-Desire-Intention Model of
Agency (Bratman, 1987; Georgeff, Pell, Pollack, Tambe, & Woodridge, 2003), the
Theory of Reasoned Action (Blue, 1995; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1981; Hausenblas, Carron,
& Mack, 1997), and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985, 1988, 1991;
Armitage & Connor, 2001; Connor & Sparks, 1996).
4 It is worth noting that there are some instances where neuroscientists do
appear to describe the behaviour of complex neural systems as if they are behaving
rationally, but even in these cases the assumption of rationality is not part of the
neuroscientific theories used to characterize and explain such behaviours. When
developing these theories, this assumption of rationality is abandoned in order to
characterize the workings of the mechanisms responsible for them. In contrast, this
idealized assumption of rationality is required in order for many psychological
theories to function at all. To abandon this assumption is to cause the theories
E. Hochstein / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2015) 1e10 5by the fact that the way in which the entire system interacts with
structures and causes external to it can also change its behaviours
in ways that cannot be predicted from an account of its lower level
mechanisms alone. As William Bechtel notes:
In virtue of being organized systems, mechanisms do things
beyond what their components do. But beyond this, the orga-
nization of the components typically integrates them into an
entity that has an identity of its own. (2007, p. 186)
Moreover, as we move up mechanistic levels (from simple
neural mechanisms, to orchestrated higher level neural mecha-
nisms, to larger physiological systems more generally), the mech-
anistic system under investigation increases in scale and
complexity. To compensate for this, scientific theories based on
distinct idealizing assumptions will need to be created in order to
represent the behaviour and capacities of the higher level system in
a manner that remains manageable and applicable.
This means that the scientific theories best used to characterize
the unique behaviour of entire integrated cognitive systems will
not be the same as those best used to characterize its lower level
mechanisms, and will have as their underlying foundation ideali-
zations and simplifying assumptions not found in the theories used
to characterize the behaviours of the sub-mechanisms that
compose them.
In recent years, a growing number of philosophers have
acknowledged this necessity in adopting multiple models with
conflicting idealizations in the study of complex systems (e.g.
Hochstein, 2015; Kellert, Longino, & Waters, 2006; Parker, 2006;
Wimsatt, 2007; Weisberg, 2013, pp. 103-105). Yet, in many cases
scientists can still use the same underlying theories as the basis for
the creation of conflicting models. One might, for instance, use the
same underlying theories of neuroscience to construct two con-
flicting models of the action potential. One might idealize the
morphology of the neuron, while the other might idealize electrical
properties of the sodium and potassium channels. In these cases,
we introduce idealizations for pragmatic purposes, but still adopt
the same underlying theories as our foundation for the different
models.
With the models of psychology and neuroscience, on the other
hand, the idealizations involved go far deeper than this. Instead of a
single theory used as the basis for the construction of both psy-
chological and neurological models, the sorts of idealizations that
the two domains adopt in their practices are used as the foundation
for distinct types of scientific theories altogether. These theories are
largely incompatible with one another given that the theories of
each domain often cannot work with the necessary idealizations
that the other domain needs to function.
For instance, given that the behaviour of an entire cognitive
system is the product of both neurological and non-neurological
causes, psychologists cannot simply take the underlying theories
of neuroscience to create useful psychological models of the
behaviour of the whole cognitive system; too many other causal
variables would be missing.
Instead, a useful psychological theory will allow for the creation
of elegant and testable hypotheses about the distinctive behav-
ioural capacities and patterns of the cognitive system as a whole,
without getting bogged down by the sheer volume of causal in-
fluences which contribute to those behaviours. In this respect,
instead of appealing to neuroscientific theories as a basis for
characterizing these cognitive behaviours, psychological theories
posit idealized states and causes that often have no place in
neuroscientific theories, but which mitigate complexity to help
represent higher level behavioural patterns.Please cite this article in press as: Hochstein, E., Giving up on convergence
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“intentions”, and other propositional attitudes to cognitive systems
in order to understand and predict their behaviours have as their
foundation the idealized assumption that such systems will behave
rationally. In other words, understanding a cognitive system in
terms of what it believes, intends, and desires, can only be infor-
mative if we assume that the systemwill act in accordance with the
rational connection between those mental states (i.e. that it will do
what it intends, pursuewhat it wants, andmake decisions based on
its beliefs). If the system acts irrationally, then its behaviour be-
comes indecipherable in terms of the ascription of propositional
attitudes (for discussion, see: Davidson, 1974; Dennett, 1987;
Føllesdal, 1982; Sehon, 1997). This assumption of rationality is a
deliberate idealization (as most people violate the norms of ratio-
nality fairly regularly), but one that has helped psychologists to
construct theories that are predictive of a range of complex
cognitive behaviours.3
Yet this idealization puts these psychological theories at odds
with many theories employed by neuroscientists. Assumptions of
rationality often have no place in our neuroscientific understanding
of the structural and causal properties of neural mechanisms.
Instead of using rationality as the foundation for constructing
neuroscientific theories, neuroscientists instead treat neural
mechanisms as neither rational nor irrational. The idealization of
rationality is one that has no role to play in such neuroscientific
theories (for explicit arguments to this effect, see: Churchland,
1981; Dennett, 1987, p. 342; Quine, 1960, p. 218; Sehon, 1997;
Stich, 1983).4
In fact, many have argued that propositional attitudes them-
selves should be treated as idealizations: mental categories that do
not correspond to any neurological categories or types of mecha-
nisms (see: Bickle, 1998, 2003, 2006; Churchland, 1981; Stich,
1983). While some have used this to argue for the elimination of
propositional attitudes from scientific psychology, others have
noted that such mental categories have allowed for the creation of
more manageable theories which can be used to form predictions
of high level behaviours that neuroscientific theories are simply ill-
equipped to provide (for more, see: Hochstein, 2012, 2013).
Another example is the use of psychological theories that make
reference to “emotions”, or specific emotional categories such as
“anger”. It has been argued that these emotional categories sub-
sume disparate and unrelated neurological mechanisms and pro-
cesses under the same ill-fitting categories, and thus they have no
place in a correct theory of the mechanisms responsible for
behaviour (see: Griffiths 1997, 2004). However, if we think of these
emotion categories as idealizations, as simplified categories used to
mitigate the complexity of the system in order to better charac-
terize its overall behavioural capabilities, then there is evidence
that psychological theories which employ such categories havewhich rely on them to become incoherent and inapplicable.
and autonomy:Why the theories of psychology and neuroscience are
of Science (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.10.001
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details, see: Barrett, 2006, p. 46). In all these cases, psychologists
are not taking established neuroscientific theories as the basis for
creating psychological models. Instead, their models are based on
distinct types of theories which have as their foundation idealiza-
tions which do not apply in the context of neuroscience.
In a similar vein, neuroscientists cannot simply take the un-
derlying theories of psychology and use them to create useful
neuroscientific models, since psychological models only charac-
terize how neural systems behave when they are organized into a
complex cognitive system, and are engaging in particular envi-
ronmental contexts. Moreover, these psychological theories are
built upon idealizations that are unhelpful for characterizing the
particular neurological structures and causes working within the
system. Instead, neuroscientists develop their own sets of theories
which adopt different sets of idealizations as their foundation.
For example, in order to study the specific contributions that
neurological mechanisms make to cognitive behaviour, neurosci-
entists often need to hold environmental factors constant to allow
for reliable and replicable manipulations of these mechanisms in
order to learn about their functions. Since environmental factors
can interfere with the functioning of the mechanism, by not hold-
ing the environment constant, it becomes impossible to tell
whether aspects of the system’s behaviours are due to structural or
environmental factors. This means that an understanding of how
the parts and operations of the system contribute to its overall
behaviour require isolating it from such factors. This information is
then used by neuroscientists to construct neuroscientific theories,
and to form generalizations about the overall behaviour of neuro-
logical systems.
The problem is that this leaves us with neuroscientific theories
that only provide an account of the behaviour of neurological
mechanisms in isolation from other causal influences and organi-
zational features that alter the behaviour of these mechanisms
when embedded within larger cognitive systems (see: Bechtel,
2015; Datteri & Laudisa, 2012; Longino, 2006; 2013). As Datteri &
Laudisa note, “these [neurological] generalizations are highly
idealized, as they omit reference to the myriads of conditions that
could perturb the behaviour of the modelled system in real-world
settings” (2012, p. 602).5
Other kinds of neurological idealizations involve downplaying
or ignoring other biological causes that contribute to cognitive
behaviour in order to focus on the contributions that neural
mechanisms make in particular. Helen Longino, for example, notes
that behavioural genetics and neurobiology characterize the causes
of phenomena like aggression and sexual orientation in incom-
patible ways. She notes that:
Each approach employs methodologies that require particular
ways of understanding the causal space. Some phenomena
regarded as causally active in one approach are simply not
included in another. These differential selections result in
incongruous causal spaces. (2006, p. 118)5 It is worth noting that domains like ecological neuroscience do try to under-
stand how neural mechanisms behave under different environmental conditions.
But even in these cases, many environmental conditions must be held constant to
see how particular environmental conditions will affect particular neural mecha-
nisms. The behaviour of the system will change radically when all these environ-
mental influences are in play, and causally interacting with the system
simultaneously. Thus the theories of ecological neuroscientists still require forming
idealized theories of the behaviour of these mechanisms given the methodological
necessity of studying these systems under laboratory conditions that remove many
environmental factors to study the influence of others.
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codependent as well as irreconcilable, Studies in History and PhilosophyWhile these sorts of idealizations are foundational to many
neuroscientific theories, it puts these theories into direct conflict
with the sorts of scientific theories needed to characterize the
behaviour of entire cognitive systems. If one is interested in
studying how entire cognitive systems behave under varying
environmental conditions, then it is unfruitful to use as our foun-
dation scientific theories which idealize away many of the other
underlying causes of such behaviours, and the environmental
contexts in which they appear. Psychological theories in social
psychology, community psychology, and developmental psychol-
ogy, are intended to characterize the capacities and behaviours of
entire cognitive systems under different conditions and in different
environments. Thus the idealizations which are used to form
neuroscientific theories must be abandoned in order to effectively
construct and test psychological theories.
So far, I have provided a largely descriptive account of the
practices of psychology and neuroscience in order to demonstrate
the problems that stand in the way of any sort of convergence
between the two domains into a single unified account. There is an
important normative point that is worth making as well however.
Namely, that even if convergence between psychology and neuro-
sciencewere possible, there are good reasons for thinking that such
a convergence would actually be undesirable and unhelpful to the
practices of both neuroscience and psychology.
We must not forget that the practice of science is performed by
scientists with finite resources and time. Thus a single all-
encompassing theory of cognitive behaviour may not prove use-
ful or beneficial for scientists to actually apply given practical and
pragmatic limitations. Recall that cognitive behaviour is not solely
the product of neurological mechanisms, but also the product of
many other biological and non-biological factors. Thus if we take
the convergence position seriously, then many more scientific do-
mains must be included in the convergence process. For a conver-
gent account of cognitive behaviour to work, it will require a
convergence of scientific domains such as psychology, neurosci-
ence, evolutionary biology, genetics, developmental systems the-
ory, economics, and sociology to name only a few (since each
identifies a different dimension of causal influences responsible for
the production of cognitive behaviour in various social and envi-
ronmental contexts). Even if all these theories could converge on a
single unified account of cognitive behaviour, the sheer volume of
causal information that would need to be gathered to understand
even simple systems would make this unified theory impractical
and inapplicable in most real world contexts. We will almost never
have all such information available to us in any one situation, even
if we knew how to generate such a unified theory in principle.
Moreover, time constraints may make it impossible to apply in
practice even if we could gather this information, and limited funds
may make it impractical as a scientific tool if it is particularly costly
to generate.
Most importantly, the development of such an all-
encompassing theory or model of the system is not necessary in
order for scientists to carry out the representational tasks that they
need accomplished. Thus instead of altering all our theories so as to
converge on a single account, what is far more advantageous is to
have a great number of idealized theories which will conflict with
one another, but which will have different pragmatic value as
representational tools in different contexts. Theories which are
highly idealized in different ways will be simpler to develop, easier
to apply, and more useful as scientific tools in the study of cognitive
systems.
The particular sorts of idealizing and simplifying assumptions
that psychology and neuroscience employ is what allows them to
be pragmatically useful at representing the particular aspects of
cognitive systems we use them to study while still working withinand autonomy:Why the theories of psychology and neuroscience are
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different representational goals of psychology and neuroscience
necessitate employing different types of theories and models
which are pragmatically useful for their particular representational
tasks, but not for the other.
This also explains why instead of witnessing psychology and
neuroscience merging into a single unified theory, what we find
instead is a further fragmentation of both psychology and
neuroscience into numerous sub-fields, each of which focuses on
studying a different restricted aspect of cognitive behaviour.
Within psychology, we have the development of cognitive psy-
chology, developmental psychology, clinical psychology, and so-
cial psychology to name only a few. Meanwhile in neuroscience
we have the emergence of behavioural neuroscience, ecological
neuroscience, computational neuroscience, and molecular
neuroscience, among others. Each sub-domain focuses on repre-
senting different aspects of cognitive systems, and in doing so
employs its own sets of models and theories which simplify and
idealize systems in different ways essential for pragmatically
satisfying the goals of those particular sub-domains. Some
idealize environmental causes, some idealize neurological details,
and some idealize other known biological or historical causes of
behaviour.
All this gives us compelling reasons for denying that neuro-
science and psychology are inevitably converging on a single
unified account of cognitive behaviour. Instead, what we have are
different domains that work with different representational goals
and interests. In virtue of this, they embrace theories which
cannot be amalgamated with those of their counterparts without
losing what make them useful for the representational tasks to
which they are put. It is their inability to integrate that makes the
theories from the different domains useful for different repre-
sentational tasks.2.2. The problem with autonomy
Recall that the primary argument used to defend the autonomy
of psychology from neuroscience depends on the notion of
multiple-realizability. This argument suggests that psychological
models identify computational states that can be instantiated in
different ways by different systems, just so long as they have the
appropriate functional organization. As such, psychological and
neuroscientific models describe properties and states which are
autonomous from one another.
While this argument has strong intuitive appeal, it runs into
problems for engineering reasons. To better understand why, it is
important to note that the way in which a computational system is
physically structured always affects the sorts of functions it is
optimized to perform. Thus, in order to get different systems that are
implemented in different ways to carry out the same function, one
must always do so at the cost of increased complexity, resources,
and time (see: Eliasmith, 2002; Le Cun & Denker, 1992; Syropoulos,
2008). When dealing with Turing machine proofs, these sorts of
issues can be safely ignored sincewe assume the system has infinite
time and infinite resources. Systems in the real world, however, are
always constrained by such limitations, and this will always trans-
late into real world behavioural differences. As Syropoulos notes,
.machine equivalence provides little information regarding
the way a machine actually computes something, and it is this
way that is cognitively relevant. For instance, although amodern
CISC [Complex Instruction Set Computer] machine is equivalent
a RISC [Reduced Instruction Set Computer] machine, in the
sense that one can compile and execute exactly the samePlease cite this article in press as: Hochstein, E., Giving up on convergence
codependent as well as irreconcilable, Studies in History and Philosophyprograms on both machines, a RISC machine is faster. [.]
Clearly, if we compile the same program under the same oper-
ating system running on two different architectures the result-
ing binary files will be completely different. Obviously both
binaries will produce the same results, but one will be executed
much faster than the other. The reason for this difference in
performance is due to the simplicity of the RISC architecture or
the complexity of the CISC architecture. (Syropoulos, 2008, p.
111)
Put simply, physical properties of the underlying mechanisms
always affect the way in which given functions are carried out,
and thus have different effects on the behavioural outputs than
alternative implementations of the same functions. This means that
the more behavioural and environmental constraints we can
identify, the more it narrows the list of implementations that can
generate those sort of functions under those sorts of conditions
within those limitations. Ultimately, only a single physical imple-
mentation will be capable of producing exactly those behaviours,
under those conditions, and in that space of time (for further dis-
cussion and elaboration, see: Bechtel, 2008; Bechtel & Mundale,
1999; Boone & Piccinini, 2015; Craver, 2007, 2009; Eliasmith,
2002, 2013; Keeley, 2000; Piccinini & Craver, 2011; Shapiro, 2004;
Syropoulos, 2008).
Given this, knowing more about the behavioural outputs of the
system necessarily informs us as to what the neurological mecha-
nisms working within the system must be like. For a concrete
example of this, consider SPAUN, a recent large-scale model of the
functioning brain developed by Eliasmith et al. (2012) used to
simulate various kinds of cognitive tasks. When discussing the
implementation of the model, Eliasmith notes the following:
Before leaving consideration of this model I want to highlight
what I think is perhaps its most theoretically interesting feature
enamely, that this model only works if it is implemented in
neurons. [.] If we directly simulate the equations that describe
this model, then it is unable to accurately reproduce the recency
and primacy effects observed in the human data. [.] Conse-
quently, we realized that one of the main reasons that this
model is able to capture the human data as it does is that the
individual neurons themselves saturate when participating in
the representation of large vectors. This saturation serves as a
kind of “soft” normalization, which is neither ideal mathemat-
ical nor a complete lack of normalization. Rather, it is more of a
subtle kind of constraint placed on the representation of vectors
in virtue of neuron response properties. And, crucially, this
constraint is directly evident in the behavioral data (i.e., it en-
ables reconstructing the correct U-shaped curve).
This observation is theoretically interesting because it provides
an unambiguous example of the importance of constructing a
neural implementation for explaining high-level psychological
behaviour. All too often researchers consider psychological and
neural-level explanations to be independent. [.] But in this
case, the dependence is clear. Without constructing the neural
model, we would have considered the mathematical charac-
terization a failure and moved on to the other, likely more
complex model. However, it is now obvious that we would have
done so unnecessarily. (Eliasmith, 2013, pp. 218-219).
Here we can see how the regularities and features identified
by psychological models are not, in fact, autonomous from
those identified by neuroscientific ones. The more detailed our
psychological generalizations about the system become, the more
they tell us about what the underlying neurological architecture of
the system must be like. Likewise, the more we know about theand autonomy:Why the theories of psychology and neuroscience are
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chological generalizations we can make about the system.
With this in mind, the assumption that neuroscience and
psychology can proceed in complete isolation from one another is
unjustified. The sorts of behaviours and capacities identified by
psychological models put essential constraints on the construc-
tion and testing of our neuroscientific models. Likewise, knowing
more about the neurological architecture of the system informs
what sorts of behaviours are possible in different environmental
contexts. This allows us to better refine the sorts of psychological
generalizations we can make about the system. As such, argu-
ments for a strict autonomy of psychology from neuroscience are
undermined. Instead, neuroscientific models and psychological
models depend on one another for better understanding and
refinement.
It is important to understand how this insight connects to the
conclusion of Section 2.1. Given that cognitive behaviour is not
produced solely by neurological mechanisms, we cannot use
neuroscientific theories alone to accurately characterize many of
the cognitive behaviours displayed by entire cognitive systems
that psychological theories are used to represent. However, given
that the system is partially constituted by these mechanisms, the
way in which these mechanisms are implemented does place
direct constrains on the possible cognitive behaviours that the
entire system is capable of engaging in under different conditions.
This information regarding the implementation of the neural
mechanisms allows us to refine and improve our psychological
models in light of the fact that these mechanisms are part of the
cognitive system. However, this does not mean that the two do-
mains will converge on a single unified theory given that the
theories and models of the different domains still must idealize
cognitive systems in incompatible ways to effectively represent
different aspects of the system.
3. An irreconcilable codependence
The relationship between neuroscience and psychology now
appears to be neither one of convergence, nor one of autonomy. On
the one hand, in order for the theories of psychology to effectively
represent the behavioural capacities and patterns of entire cogni-
tive systems, they must take as their foundation sets of idealizing
assumptions that put them at odds with the sorts of idealizations
that neuroscientific theories must adopt. In this sense, to force
neuroscientific theories and psychological theories to converge and
unify would be to strip them of the very conflicting idealizations
thatmake them representationally useful for the different purposes
to which they are put. On the other hand, if we conclude that
neuroscience and psychology should therefore operate in isolation
from one another, then we ignore the essential constraints that the
two domains place on one another. In this respect, the theories
from one domain are needed to help construct and test theories in
the other domain.
We now appear to be in a position where the more we try to
bring psychology and neuroscience together, the worse both
become at achieving their different representational goals, but
similarly the more we pull them apart, the worse both become at
being able to refine and improve their models and theories. We
are therefore left with an irreconcilable codependence between
the two domains; a constant and unavoidable back and forth
between domains that allows each domain to improve and pro-
vide better theories without moving towards unification or
convergence.
More importantly, I propose that this inability for the two do-
mains to converge or stand apart from each other is not a problem
that must be overcome, but is in fact the very thing that allows bothPlease cite this article in press as: Hochstein, E., Giving up on convergence
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models from the two domains are irreconcilable is what allows
them to generate different kinds of information about the target
system by representing them in distinct ways. The idealizations
employed by the different domains is precisely what allows sci-
entists to form testable theories and gather distinct information
about different facets of the cognitive system that the other domain
needs in order to refine its own theories, but cannot gather using
the limitations of their own idealized theories and models. In this
respect, attempts to pull psychology and neuroscience apart from
one another, or to merge them together into a single account, are
both inappropriate for the same reason: they ignore what makes
each domain informative to the other. It is the dynamic interaction
between the two domains that allows them to be useful for distinct
representational goals, but also to learn and improve from each
other.
When it comes to the arguments for autonomy and conver-
gence, both get part of the story right, but draw the wrong
conclusions from it. Those who argue for autonomy are correct
that we can generate psychological generalizations about
cognitive systems autonomously from studying their neurolog-
ical implementation. The models from psychology heavily
idealize many of the mechanistic details of the system so as to
form more elegant and easily applicable theories which can be
used to identify general behavioural patterns and capacities
without having to gather all the underlying causal information
about the system. Likewise, neuroscientists often study the
behaviour of neurological mechanisms in isolation of the other
mechanisms and environmental factors which influence cogni-
tive behaviour.
But while this gives the appearance of autonomy between the
two domains, it would be wrong to conclude from this that the way
in which the neurological mechanisms of the system are imple-
mented does not matter to, or inform our understanding of, the
overall cognitive capabilities and regularities of the system.
Knowing these details allows us to better determine what the
system can do in different situations, and thus to refine our psy-
chological models. Likewise, the more we know about the overall
behaviours of the system gained through the application of our
psychological models, the more it informs what the neural mech-
anisms must be like. Thus autonomy between neuroscience and
psychology would be the wrong conclusion to draw.
Meanwhile, those who advocate for convergence make the
opposite mistake. They rightly note that the models of psychology
and the models of neuroscience directly inform one another, and
allow us to refine and improve our different accounts. Their mistake
is to conclude from this that the two domains must therefore be
moving towards integration. Yet this does not follow either. Im-
provements to both domains do not lead towards integration or
isolation, but merely to the fact that different theories and models
get better at the particular representational tasks we use them for.
Refining and improving a psychological model based on neuro-
logical data, for instance, does not require that we thereby turn the
psychological model into a neurological one (since this would
defeat the purpose of using it for a distinct representational pur-
pose), only that we use the neurological data to improve the psy-
chological model’s ability to represent the behaviours of the entire
cognitive system by including new boundary conditions, more
detailed generalizations, and recognizing previously unknown
constraints.
Before bringing things to a close, it is worth noting that there
have been other theorists who have similarly defended a view that
is neither one of converge, nor autonomy. William Bechtel and
Lindley Darden, for instance, both advocate views that differ from
the traditional accounts. While in many ways the position I defendand autonomy:Why the theories of psychology and neuroscience are
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in important respects from the one defended here.6
Darden, for instance, defends a view of interfield integration
(Darden,1986,1993; Darden & Craver, 2002; Darden &Maull, 1977),
whereby the theories from different domains do not converge on a
single unifying theory, but instead are all integrated into a larger
unifying framework. In these cases, the theories from the different
domains remain distinct, but are used to characterize different
compositional levels of the same multi-level mechanistic system.
As Darden puts it:
In contrast, in interfield analyses no derivation is postulated and
no elimination occurs; instead, bridges are built between two
different bodies of knowledge. The focus is on the bridging re-
lations, which sometimes constitute an actual theory, such as
the chromosome theory of Mendelian heredity. (Thus, what for
the reductionist are reduction functions constructed by the
philosopher are, for the interfield case, the actual bridging
theory constructed by the scientist.) In cases in which the
separate bodies of knowledge can be ordered hierarchically, the
bridging theories are interlevel theories. The bridges serve to
unify, but not to eliminate, fields. (1993, p.143)
The problem with Darden’s account is the assumption that the
theories from the different domains will seamlessly fit together
(once the appropriate bridging theories, or hierarchical relations,
are discovered) in the context of the unifying framework. In
contrast, I have proposed that the very reason why the theories
from the different domains can be informative to one another is
precisely because they cannot be integrated within the same
framework in this way. It is their very inability to integrate together
that allows the two domains to relevantly inform one another, as
well as to improve and grow.
A similar account of interfield integration has also been defen-
ded by Bechtel (1984, 1986). In this respect, Bechtel’s account runs
into the same problems that Darden’s account faces. There have
been some instances, however, where Bechtel offers a somewhat
different story. In some cases, Bechtel suggests that what differ-
entiates psychological theories from neuroscientific theories is in
fact the grain of abstraction adopted in the description of the
neurological mechanisms under investigation (it is unclear exactly
how this fits into his integrative framework however). He claims
that psychological descriptions are coarse-grained descriptions of
the same neurological mechanisms that neuroscientific theories
describe in fine-grained detail (see: Bechtel, 2008, p.138-142;
Bechtel & Mundale, 1999). More specifically:
Thus, one diagnosis of what has made the multiple realizability
claim as plausible as it is has been is that researchers have
employed different grains of analysis in identifying psycholog-
ical states and brain states, using a coarse grain to identify
psychological states and a fine grain to differentiate brain states
(Mundale & Bechtel, 1999, p. 202)6 Given the prolific nature of both Bechtel and Darden’s work, one can find
passages in their writings that both support, and argue against, points made in this
paper. As such, I will focus on the sorts of commitments that Bechtel and Darden
have defended which run counter to the view defended here in order to highlight
where such commitments go wrong. Likewise, given the sheer volume of literature
on the relationship between neuroscience and psychology, there are likely many
more theorists who can be mentioned here in addition to Bechtel and Darden.
Many of these theorists propose views very similar in kind to the sorts proposed by
Darden and Bechtel, and so using them as paradigm examples should hopefully
demonstrate how the account on offer here differs from many of these alternatives
as well.
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demonstrated that psychological descriptions should not be inter-
preted merely as coarse grained descriptions of neurological
mechanisms. They describe behaviours caused by influences
beyond the neural. Second, I have argued that what differentiates
psychological theories from neuroscientific theories is not simply
the grain of abstraction employed, but more importantly the sorts
of idealizations employed by the different domains.
Darden and Bechtel both overlook the fact that the very ideali-
zations which stand in the way of the integrative projects they
espouse plays not only an essential role in differentiating psycho-
logical theories from neuroscientific ones, but also in being the
driving force that allows the two domains to learn from each other
and improve over time. In this sense, the project of integration
proposed by Bechtel and Darden run into the same problems that
plagued the convergence account.
4. Conclusion
The relationship between neuroscience and psychology has
been traditionally conceived as either moving towards unification,
or moving towards autonomy. In this paper, I have argued that
neither is correct. Instead, progress in both domains is dependent
on the fact that they represent systems in ways that make inte-
gration impossible, but likewise do not work in isolation from one
another. There is a back and forth between the two domains that
allows both to be improved and refined over time despite never
resulting in a unified account, or working autonomously from one
another. Instead, there is an irreconcilable codependence between
the two fields.
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